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Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v.
Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection
and First Amendment Analysis
Benjamin Hoorn Barton
INTRODUCTION

During voir-direl examination in a criminal trial, the prosecutor
notices that a black venire person is wearing a cross., Without asking any further questions, the prosecutor uses one of her peremptory challenges2 to remove this venire person from the jury panel.
In response to this strike, the defense counsel raises an objection
under Batson v. Kentucky3 that the peremptory challenge is racebased and therefore impermissible. The court asks the prosecutor
to state a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. The prosecutor explains that the defendant is Christian and that the venire person may be biased.
This explanation is likely to be found legitimate under current
law. Batson and its progeny eliminated race-based peremptory
challenges, but courts have generally limited Batson to race and
1. A jury is selected from the venire - a panel of prospective jurors - and voir dire is
the questioning process used in the selection of jurors. "[I]t is necessary to select from the
panel of prospective jurors those individuals who will actually serve as jurors in [the] case.
The examination of prospective jurors for this purpose is commonly referred to as the voir
dire .•.." 2 WAYNER.LAFAVE & JEROID H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3, at 718
(1985).
2. Challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are the two methods of preventing a
potential juror from being impanelled. "Challenges for cause, the Supreme Court has noted,
'permit rejection of jurors on narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable bases of
partiality.' Both the defense and the prosecution may challenge an unlimited number of
jurors for cause .... Usually, not many prospective jurors are lost in this way." 2 LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 21.3, at 728 (1985) (footnote omitted) (quoting Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965)). Peremptory challenges, however, formerly were "exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Swain,
380 U.S. at 220. However, the Supreme Court cases of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1985), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), among others, have curtailed the arbitrary nature of the peremptory challenge by ruling that it is unconstitutional to
remove potential jurors solely on the basis of race (Batson) or sex (J.E.B.).
3. 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1985). Batson held that race-based peremptory challenges violate
the rights of the defendant and the potential juror: "The Equal Protection Clause guarantees
the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on
account of race . . . . [B]y denying a person participation in jury service on account of his
race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.'' 476 U.S. at 8687.
Once a litigant objects to a peremptory challenge as unconstitutional under Batson, the
striking party must give a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. For a discussion of this
procedure and Batson in general, see infra text accompanying notes 13-22.
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permitted religion-based peremptories.4 Courts have allowed peremptory challenges of black potential jurors5 because of the juror's
"fringe religious group preference,"6 the juror's choice to "omit[ ]
an answer to the religious preference question on the juror information card,"7 and on the basis that the juror "carried a Bible."8 In all
of these cases, the lawyer who exercised the peremptory challenge
failed to present any connection between the potential juror's religious affiliation and the case at hand, nor was there any information
about the potential juror's specific beliefs.
The analysis relied upon by these courts must be reassessed,
however, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,9 which extended Batson's protections to genderbased peremptory challenges. J.E.B. opens the question whether
Batson should be extended further to eliminate religion-based peremptory challenges. At present there is a split in authority concerning the constitutionality of religion-based peremptory challenges.10
4. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2120 (1994); State v. Lundgren, Nos. 90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL 346444, at *39 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993), affd., 653 N.E.2d 304 (1995).
5. This Note uses "venire person" and "potential juror" interchangeably.
6. Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App.1987). The religious groups at
issue were the Church of Christ and the Jehovah's Witnesses. 724 S.W.2d at 442.
7. Grady v. State, 730S.W.2d191, 195 (Tex. Ct. App.1987), vacated, 761S.W.2d19 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988).
8. State v. Worthy, 532 So. 2d 541, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
9. 114 s. Ct. 1419 (1994).
10. Only one case has squarely held that under Batson and J.E.B. religion-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional. See Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (en bane). One federal circuit court has intimated in dicta
that Batson extends to religion. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir.
1991), vacated in part on rehg. en bane, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1390 (1993).
The Third Circuit, however, has allowed religion as a race-neutral explanation for a Batson objection. United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 927 (1990). Numerous state courts have ruled similarly. See, e.g., People v. Malone,
570 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991) (allowing a
strike because religion played a major role in the juror's life); State v. Worthy, 532 So. 2d 541,
553 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing a strike because the juror carried a Bible); State v. Davis,
504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d
577, 583 (Miss. 1988) (allowing dismissal of a juror because of "non-committal" responses to
religious questions); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987) (stating that in exercising peremptory challenges "[c]ounsel must rely upon perceptions of attitudes based upon
demeanor, gender ••• religion, and many other fundamental background facts").
Some state courts have eliminated certain types of peremptory challenges of potential
jurors under their state constitutions. See People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 574 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that peremptories based on an identifiable group, such as race or religion, violate
the state constitution); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1153 n.15 (Colo. 1987) (noting decisions of other state courts); Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding the peremptory challenge of Jews unconstitutional under the state constitution);
State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 850 (Haw. 1990) (holding gender-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Carleton, 629 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Mass. App. Ct.
1993) (holding peremptory challenges based on bias inferred from membership in a discrete
community group unconstitutional); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1154 (N.J. 1986) (hold-
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This Note argues that under Batson, J.E.B., the First Amendment,11 and the Equal Protection Clause,12 religion-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional. This Note asserts that the
analysis of governmental religious discrimination, such as a peremptory challenge, is the same under either the First Amendment
or the Equal Protection Clause because both apply strict scrutiny to
purposeful government discrimination.
Part I examines Batson and J.E.B. in greater detail and states a
model for analyzing discriminatory peremptory challenges in which
such challenges are treated as intentional governmental discrimination subject to heightened scrutiny. Part II argues that under the
First Amendment, intentional governmental religious discrimination, such as a peremptory challenge, is strictly scrutinized. Part III
asserts that strict scrutiny is applied to religious discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause as well. Part IV applies the
strict scrutiny standard to religion-based peremptory challenges and
concludes that such challenges are not narrowly tailored and therefore are unconstitutional. Part V addresses the practical difficulties
involved in finding religion-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional and argues that they are not significant enough to preserve
the use of religion-based peremptory challenges.
I.

THE

BATSON-J.EB.

MODEL

In assessing the constitutionality of religion-based peremptory
challenges, it is important first to understand the Court's precedents
concerning race- and gender-based peremptory challenges and the
Court's general approach under the Equal Protection Clause. Section I.A argues that Batson did not apply traditional equal protection analysis and left the possibility of expanding Batson beyond
race unclear. Section I.B argues that the cases following Batson esing peremptory challenges based solely on membership in a cognizable group
unconstitutional).
There is also a split among recent commentators. Compare J. Suzanne Bell Chambers,
Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569 (1995)
(arguing religion·based peremptory challenges are constitutional) with Angela J. Mason,
Note, Discrimination Based on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge's Coffin?, 29 GA. L. REv. 493 (1995) (arguing the opposite) and David G. Hart &
Russell D. Cawyer, Batson and its Progeny Prohibit the Use of Peremptory Challenges Based
Upon Disability and Religion: A Practitioner's Guide for Requesting a Civil Batson Hearing,
26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 109 (1995) (arguing the same from a Texas practitioner's point of
view).
11. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .•.." U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
12. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV,§ 1.
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tablish that peremptory challenges are subject to traditional equal
protection analysis and that J.E.B. sets the model for such analysis.
A. Batson and Traditional Equal Protection Jurisprudence
Batson did not apply traditional equal protection analysis to
race-based peremptory challenges. Batson departed from traditional equal protection analysis in two ways. First, Batson created a
unique structure for establishing intentional governmental discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges, and second, once intentional discrimination was established, Batson did not apply strict
scrutiny to race-based peremptories.
Batson's treatment of peremptory challenges was unusual because of the mechanism the Court used to establish purposeful government discrimination. Under traditional equal protection
analysis, the Court requires proof of intentional discrimination to
invalidate government race discrimination.13 To find intentional
discrimination, the Court usually differentiates between government acts that facially discriminate14 and government acts that are
facially neutral but have a disparate impact1s upon a racial group.
If an act is facially discriminatory, the Court infers intent to discriminate.16 If the government act is facially neutral but disparately impacts a racial group, the Court requires a separate showing of
intent.17 Batson never stated whether race-based peremptory challenges constituted facial discrimination.1s
13. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264·65 (1977)
("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause."); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976).
14. A government act facially discriminates if it explicitly singles out a group for different
treatment. The antimiscegenation law struck down in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), is
an example of facial discrimination.
15. If a government act does not facially classify according to race but disproportionately
affects one racial group, it is said to have disparate impact. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at
265-66. An example of disparate impact is a government job test that disproportionately
eliminates black candidates. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 232-33.
16. See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("A racial classification,
regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an
extraordinary justification."); cf. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (describing the standard
for establishing invidious intent for legislation which is "neutral on its face").
17. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. This focus on discriminatory intent has been
widely criticized. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-20,
at 1509-10 (2d ed. 1988); Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration,
1983 SuP. CT. REv. 397; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflection on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1321 n.170 (1991).
18. Peremptory challenges are not facially discriminatory. A peremptory challenge can
be used to strike potential jurors of any race for any reason. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 221-22 (1965) ("In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause."). Although the use
of the peremptory challenge has had a disparate impact on minorities, a showing of disparate
impact is insufficient proof of intentional discrimination. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-42 (using
jury selection cases as support for requiring a separate showing of intent beyond a showing of
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Instead, Batson stated a three-part test to establish purposeful
discrimination in the use of a peremptory challenge.19 First, the defendant must establish a prim.a facie case of race discrimination.20
Then the burden shifts to the prosecutor to state a race-neutral explanation.21 Finally, the trial court must determine whether the
peremptory challenge is race-based and improper.22
disparate impact). Therefore, intentional discrimination must be demonstrated before a peremptory challenge can be invalidated. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 ("[The] 'invidious quality'
of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose."' (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 240)). Prior to Batson, a showing of purposeful discrimination was practically impossible because the peremptory challenge
had been wholly unexplained.
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court attempted to eliminate race-based
peremptory challenges and leave the peremptory challenge unexplained. Swain required the
defendant to prove a systematic history of racial discrimination by a prosecutor in order to
invalidate any peremptory challenge as racially discriminatory. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-22.
At the same time, Swain refused to force litigants to explain any particular peremptory challenge. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-22. Swain's burden of proof proved crippling, however, and
Swain was widely criticized as an ineffective remedy for discriminatory peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 510 n.12 (Mass. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) ("In light of the extensive criticism of Swain, and in recognition of
the negligible protection that decision offers to a defendant asserting the right to trial by jury
of peers, we take this opportunity to depart from applying its rule perfunctorily .•.."); State
v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 717 (N.M. a. App. 1980) ("[T]he challenge allowed in Swain may
be too limited.... [T]he California experience with the Swain rule has resulted in numerous
attempts to meet the Swain burden with no success •..." (citations omitted)); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 164 (1989) ("Under Swain, the Constitution
guaranteed minorities only an opportunity to reach the finals before a government officer
discriminated against them."); Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Prospective Jurors with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REv.
289, 306-09 {1993) {describing Swain as "powerful in principle, pathetic in practice"); John
Andrew Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and his
Peerless Jury, 4 Haus. L. REv. 448 (1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE LJ.
322 (1965); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the All-White Jury,
52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966); Note, Peremptory Challenge - Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. LJ. 157 (1967).
19. This three-part test overturned Swain's "crippling burden of proof," Batson, 416 U.S.
at 92-94, and allowed litigants to prove invidious intent in the use of a specific peremptory
challenge, Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96. The Court's decision to adopt a unique three-part test
rather than to rely on the traditional categories of facial discrimination and disparate impact
may be evidence that these categories do not effectively reveal invidious discrimination. See
generally MacKinnon, supra note 17.
20. Under Batson, a prima facie case is established by proving that the excluded juror and
the criminal defendant are members of a cognizable racial group and by proving "any other
relevant circumstances." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Such circumstances might include a pattern
of strikes against black jurors or the prosecutor's questions during voir dire. Batson, 476 U.S.
at 97.
Note that Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), eliminated the requirement that the defendant and the struck juror be of the same race.
21. For a full discussion of race-neutral explanations, see Michael J. Raphael & Edward J.
Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 229 (1993).
22. Batson states:
[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection
of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial.
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The second Batson Equal Protection Clause irregularity is that
the Court never applied strict scrutiny23 after establishing a framework for finding intentional discrimination. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court applies strict scrutiny to intentional
discrimination prior to invalidation.24 Once Batson created a
framework to find intentional discrimination, strict scrutiny should
have been applied.25 Because of these irregularities, it was unclear
whether Batson should be analyzed as part of the Court's equal
protection tradition and, if so, whether it could be expanded beyond race.26
B.

The J.B.B. Model for Assessing Religion-Based Peremptory
Challenges

The cases that followed Batson clarified its ambiguous relationship to the Equal Protection Clause. These cases did three things.
First, they expanded Batson, which addressed only prosecutorial
peremptories in criminal trials, to race-based peremptory challenges by nongovernment litigants and to civil trials.27 Second, they
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to
come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.... [T]he prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause••••
The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established
purposeful discrimination.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98.
Note that the Court recently held that proving that the race-neutral explanation is a pretext, without an affirmative showing of intent to discriminate, is insufficient under Batson.
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
23. Strict scrutiny requires that a government act must serve a legitimate purpose and be
''narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 279-80 (1986).
24. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-97 (1989).
25. Chief Justice Burger noted this equal protection irregularity in his dissent: "The
Court never applies this conventional equal protection framework to the claims at hand,
perhaps to avoid acknowledging that the state interest involved here has historically been
regarded by this Court as substantial, if not compelling." Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
26. Chief Justice ~urger, in his Batson dissent, was the first to state that Batson was not a
traditional equal protection case and that Batson was limited to race:
That the Court is not applying conventional equal protection analysis is shown by its
limitation of its new rule to allegations of impermissible challenge on the basis of race
.... But if conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably defendants
could object to exclusions on the basis of not only race, but also sex, age, religious or
political affiliation ....
Batson, 476 U.S. at 123-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Later courts picked
up on this language and refused to extend Batson to religion. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504
N.W.2d 767, 769-71(Minn.1993), cert. denied, 114 S. a. 2120 (1994); Lundgren v. Ohio, Nos.
90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL 346444, at *39 (Ohio a. App. Sept. 14, 1993).
27. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), first expanded Batson to criminal defendants of
any race. Next, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Court extended Batson to jury selection in civil trials. The question- in Edmonson was whether peremptory challenges by private litigants, as opposed to a state prosecutor, could be state
action subject to the strictures of equal protection. The Court decided that private attorneys
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established that potential jurors themselves have an equal protection right to nondiscriminatory jury-selection procedures.28
Third, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. established that Batson is
not limited to race and that traditional Equal Protection principles
are applicable to the peremptory challenge. In J.E.B., the Court
applied "equal protection jurisprudence" to extend Batson to gender.w The Court applied intermediate scrutiny3o to peremptory
challenges on the basis of gender31 and held that such peremptories
were unconstitutional.32 J.E.B. followed Batson in applying a
are state actors in selecting juries, stating tbat peremptory challenges involve "overt, significant participation of tbe government," tbat peremptories perform "a traditional function of
tbe government," and tbat the injury caused by discriminatory peremptory challenges is
"more severe because the government permits it to occur witbin tbe courthouse itself." Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620-28.
Lastly, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 {1992), extended Batson to race-based peremptory challenges by criminal defendants. Mccollum completed tbe Court's goal of eliminating
race-based peremptory challenges by extending Batson to virtually all jury-trial settings.
28. McCol/um, 505 U.S. at 48 ("[D]enying a person participation in jury service on account of his race unconstitutionally discriminates against tbe excluded juror."); Edmonson,
500 U.S. at 618 ("[R]ace-based peremptory challenge[s] violate[] tbe equal protection rights
of those excluded from jury service."); Powers, 499 U.S. at 409 ("An individual juror does not
have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess tbe right not to be
excluded from one on account of race."); see also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92 CowM. L. REv. 725 (1992).
29. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994). J.E.B. dealt witb a paternity suit by tbe State of Alabama on the behalf of a single motber. During jury selection, tbe
state used nine of ten peremptory challenges to strike men, resulting in an all-female jury.
114 S. Ct. at 1421-22.
30. "[G]ender-based classifications require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (quoting Personnel Admr. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
Under tbe Equal Protection Clause, tbe Supreme Court applies tbree separate standards
of review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. Strict scrutiny is
applied to inherently suspect classifications, such as racial classifications. See, e.g., Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986). Gender has never been found to be an
inherently suspect classification and therefore receives intermediate scrutiny. See J.E.B., 114
S. Ct. at 1425 n.6 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,458 U.S. 718, 724n.9 (1982)).
Government acts which burden a fundamental right are also strictly scrutinized. See San
Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411U.S.1, 31-33 (1973). All otber types of government classifications are reviewed under "rational basis review." See, e.g., Pennell v. City of
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 {1988) {holding tbat government classifications must be " 'rationally
related to a legitimate state interest'" (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976))).
31. Note that J.E.B. 's application of intermediate scrutiny settles tbe essential Batson
equal protection irregularity. Once intentional discrimination is established, traditional
equal protection jurisprudence is applied, and tbe Court applies tbe appropriate level of scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny is applied to gender; strict scrutiny is applied to religion. See
infra Parts II and III.
32. The Court stated:
Equal opportunity to participate in tbe fair administration of justice is fundamental
to our democratic system. It not only furthers tbe goals of tbe jury system. It reaffirms
the promise of equality under tbe law - tbat all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or
gender, have tbe chance to take part directly in our democracy.
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
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three-part test for establishing intentional gender discrimination in
the use of a peremptory challenge.33
J.E.B. sets the model for assessing the constitutionality of peremptory challenges. Individual jurors have a right to nondiscrimination in jury selection procedures. The Batson three-part
test is used to establish the requisite showing of discriminatory intent. If a peremptory challenge is used to exclude groups protected
by the Equal Protection Clause, it is analyzed under traditional
equal protection principles, and heightened scrutiny is applied.
II.

STRICT SCRUTINY UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In order to assess the constitutionality of religion-based peremptory challenges, it is necessary to establish the level of scrutiny applied to government acts which discriminate on the basis of religion.
Part II argues that under the First Amendment, governmental religious discrimination must be strictly scrutinized. Part III argues
that under traditional equal protection jurisprudence, governmental
religious discrimination must be strictly scrutinized. ~s Note first
analyzes religious discrimination under the First Amendment because the Equal Protection Clause offers no new constitutional
rights: instead, it requires states to protect other constitutional
rights held by their citizens. Therefore, an understanding of the
First Amendment implications of religion-based peremptory challenges must precede any equal protection analysis.
Part II.A argues that under either the Free Exercise Clause or
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, intentional governmental religious discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny under
an analysis which is similar to equal protection jurisprudence. The
Court searches for antireligious animus, relying on the familiar categories of facial discrimination and disparate impact. If intentional
discrimination is found, the Court applies strict scrutiny. Part II.B
argues that strict scrutiny is especially appropriate for religionbased peremptory challenges because the Court has repeatedly
stated the need for government neutrality in the selection of government officials.

A. Intentional Government Religious Discrimination Under the
First Amendment
This section argues that the analysis of government religious discrimination is the same under either clause of the First Amendment: the Court searches for intentional discrimination and applies
33. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-30.
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strict scrutiny to such discrimination.34 The First Amendment
states "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."35 The Court
has generally separated the amendment into the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Governmental religious discrimination violates both clauses of the First Amendment. Under
both clauses, the Court has repeatedly ruled that the government
must remain neutral among religions.36 When the government discriminates on the basis of religion, it violates this constitutional
mandate. Free exercise of religion is abridged because the government is treating a group of persons differently on the basis of their
free exercise rights. The Establishment Clause is violated because
in discriminating against one religious group the government is establishing another.37 The primary First Amendment violation involved in governmental religious discrimination is the violation of
government religious neutrality. Consequently, both clauses are
applicable.
There are three levels of scrutiny that are presently applied to
violations of the First Amendment. The highest level of scrutiny,
which can be called absolute protection, states that "a law targeting
religious belief as such is never permissible ...."38 Any governmental act which explicitly targets religious belief is per se invalid.
The second level of scrutiny applied is strict scrutiny. Under strict
scrutiny the government act "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest." 39 Government acts which facially discriminate on the ba34. This Note also argues that this same analysis applies under the Equal Protection
Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 61-79. This Note, therefore, argues for a unified
standard for assessing the constitutionality of governmental religious discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81. This is not to suggest that these bodies of law are identical or that all constitutional questions regarding religion should be treated the same.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. Compare Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2491 (1994) (stating that the
Establishment Clause requires governmental religious neutrality) with Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2234 (1993) ("The Free Exercis~ Clause
commits government itself to religious tolerance ...•"); see also Michael W. McConnell &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1, 10-12 (1989) (arguing for governmental religious neutrality as a "baseline" for the
First Amendment).
The Court has also recognized that the two clauses are "interrelat[ed]" and "complementary'' in " 'secur[ing] religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.' " Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (citations omitted).
37. For example, if the government were to ban the religious practices of minority religions, it would essentially establish the majority religion as the government's religion of
choice.
38. Lukum~ 113 S. Ct at 2227 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)). As an
example of such a law, the Court has used a prohibition on "bowing down before a golden
calf." See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
39. Lukum~ 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
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sis of religion are strictly scrutinized under either clause of the Frrst
Amendment.40
The lowest level of scrutiny is rational basis.41 Under the
Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 42 government
acts that are neutral and generally applicable, but that affect religious practice, receive rational basis review.43 Prior to Smith, the
level of review for such "neutral" acts was unclear; the Court sometimes applied strict scrutiny44 and sometimes rational basis re40. For a Free Exercise Clause example, see Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233. For an Establishment Clause example, see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982).
41. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990} (holding that the First
Amendment does not exempt religious adherents from a "neutral, generally applicable regulatory law").
42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith dealt with a claim by members of the Native American
Church that Oregon's criminal drug statutes unconstitutionally curtailed their free exercise
right to sacramental use of peyote. See 494 U.S. at fr75.
43. 494 U.S. at 878-79. The Smith decision has been widely criticized. See Lukumi, 113 S.
Ct. at 2240-50 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing for a reexamination of Smith}; Michael W.
McConneU, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109
(1990) [hereinafter McConnel1, Free Exercise Revisionism] (stating that Smith has little
grounding in authority and diminishes the status of free exercise); Steven D. Smith, The Rise
and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 231-37
(1991); Eddie Lam, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith: The Limits of the Free Exercise Clause, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 377 (1991).
In response to Smith, and in· an effort to restore strict scrutiny review, Congress passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)).
The Act's stated purpose is: "To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened •.•• " 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b}(l}. The "compelling interest test" of Sherbert and Yoder is a strict scrutiny standard: Government action may substantially burden an individual's free exercise of
religion only if the government demonstrates that the action furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. For a discussion
of the RFRA, see Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the
Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 247 (1994), and Leon F. Szetpycki & Jean B.
Arnold, Commentary: Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 88 Enuc. L. REP. 907 (1994).
Professor McConnell argues that the law may be unconstitutional depending on the Court's
reading of the Fust Amendment:
If citizens have the right to practice their religion subject only to the government's overriding need to protect peace and safety, then Congress can use Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that right.•••
. . • If citizens do not have an inherent right to have their religious beliefs accommodated, then the power of Congress to make such a law is less clear.
Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 181, 187-88 (1992) (emphasis
omitted).
Furthermore, Congress does not have the power to change the Court's treatment of the
First Amendment. Therefore, Congress' action does not affect "cases under the Free Exercise Clause; it applies only to cases brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act."
Szetpycki & Arnold, supra, at 915.
44. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.");
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (holding that a burden on the free exercise of religion must be
justified by a "compelling state interest").
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view.45 Smith explicitly did not alter the level of review. for
government acts that facially discriminate, reaffirming numerous
precedents and stating that the Court "strictly scrutinize[s] governmental classifications based on religion." 46
The distinction drawn by Smith between facial and neutral government acts for the First Amendment brings the Court's treatment
of religion into conformity with its treatment of race and sex under
the Equal Protection Clause. The level of scrutiny applied depends
upon a finding of intentional discrimination and on the categories
of facial discrimination and disparate impact.47 Smith explicitly recognizes the parallel:
Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based on race ... so too we strictly scrutinize governmental
classifications based on religion. But, we have held that race-neutral
laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial group do not thereby become subject to compellinginterest analysis under the Equal Protection Clause . . . . Our conclusion that generally applicable, religion neutral laws that have the ef45. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 450-51
(1988) (holding that incidental effects of government programs that make it more difficult to
practice certain religions do not require compelling justification); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 706-07 (1986) (holding that a lower standard exists for indirect government burdens on
religious practices); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (holding that military regulations are subject to a less stringent First Amendment standard).
46. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
246-47 (1981) (holding that a government rule that grants denominational preferences "must
be invalidated unless justified by a compelling governmental interest and unless it is closely
fitted to further that interest"); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1438 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (subjecting religious classifications to "heightened scrutiny"); Davis v.
Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same).
Note that although Smith and the later decision, Lukum~ both state that strict scrutiny is
to be applied to purposeful religious discrimination there is some confusion about what this
exactly means. Professor Steven Smith has suggested that under Lukumi and Smith, the
government act must be motivated by an intent to persecute a particular religious faith. See
Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 519, 558-61 (1994). Professor Abner Greene formulated the test in terms of an intent
to "burden religion." See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
YALE L.J. 1611, 1612 n.9 (1993). Professor Michael McConnell read Smith to require "deliberate discrimination against religion." See McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note
43, at 1111. This Note's reading of Lukumi and Smith as creating a religion model which
parallels the equal protection model contradicts Professor Smith's conclusion that intent to
persecute is necessary to prove purposeful discrimination. A showing that the act purposefully targets religious conduct or affiliation should be sufficient. But cf. id. at 1137-41 (arguing that Smith's reliance on equal protection cases ill suits free exercise jurisprudence).
47. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. Note that Smith's command that government acts be "neutral and of general applicability" essentially imports the Court's intent
requirement from the equal protection disparate impact cases. In order to invalidate a generally applicable government act (in other words, an act which is not facially discriminatory),
the Court requires a showing of nonneutrality or intentional discrimination. In the free exercise case immediately following Smith, the Court relied on a showing of purposeful religious
discrimination. Lukum~ 113 S. a. at 2227-30. Two justices relied on discriminatory statements in the act's legislative history. Lukum~ 113 S. Ct. at 2230-31 (opinion of Kennedy, J.,
joined by Stevens, J.).
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feet of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified
by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible with these [equal protection] precedents.4 8

The first free exercise case decided after Smith, Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 4 9 applied strict scrutiny
to invalidate an ordinance passed by the City of Hialeah, Florida
which outlawed ritualistic animal sacrifice.50 The law was passed in
response to the arrival in Hialeah of a Santeria Church.s1 Lukumi
restated the rule that intentional religious discrimination is reviewed under strict scrutiny,52 thereby establishing that strict scrutiny was still applicable under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment after Smith.
The Court has also applied strict scrutiny to intentional government religious discrimination under the Establishment Clause.
Larson v. Valente53 dealt with a Minnesota law that implemented a
new tax structure that reserved certain tax benefits solely to religious organizations that received more than half of their total contributions from members ("the fifty percent rule"). Prior to the
fifty percent rule, all religious organizations had been tax exempt.54
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citations and emphasis omitted).
49. 113 s. Ct. 2217 (1993).
50. Lukumi did not rely upon a finding of facial discrimination. The Court stated that the
statute's reference to "sacrifice" and "ritual" was not conclusively facial, because these words
have secular as well as religious meanings. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227. Instead, the Court
searched for invidious intent by considering whether the law was (a) neutral and (b) of general applicability. In finding that the law was not neutral, the Court looked to the circumstances surrounding the passage of the law and its language. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-31.
The Court relied on similar findings of discriminatory intent in holding that the statute was
not of general applicability. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2232-33. Once the Court decided that the
law was not neutral or generally applicable, strict scrutiny was applied, and the law was held
unconstitutional. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. ai 2233-34.
Under both of Lukumi's inquiries the Court focused on the purpose of the law. Note that
only two Justices supported reviewing the legislative history of the act. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at
2230-31 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.); cf. 113 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Rehnquist, CJ.) (refusing to join Kennedy and Stevens in assessing the
"subjective motivation of the lawmakers" but supporting exploration of the "object" of the
law in assessing neutrality (emphasis omitted)).
After Lukumi, Smith, and RFRA, the status of facially neutral religious discrimination is
muddled. If a case involving a facially neutral law which impacts religious practices is
brought under the RFRA, strict scrutiny is applied. If such a case is brought under the First
Amendment, Smith and Lukumi suggest that if a discriminatory purpose can be found, strict
scrutiny is applied. If the law is neutral, rational basis review is proper. Nevertheless, this
controversy does not affect the status of intentional discrimination: it is reviewed under strict
scrutiny.
51. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2223-24. In the Santeria religion, "one of the principal forms of
devotion is an animal sacrifice." Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2222.
52. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227 (holding that strict scrutiny applies if "the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct").
53. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
54. Larson, 456 U.S. at 231.
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The Supreme Court found that the :fifty _percent iule was a government act that favored certain religions (those· under the :fifty percent cutoff) for tax purposes. The Court ruled that this preference
constituted facial discrimination55 and applied strict scrutiny in invalidating the statute:
The clearest command of the Establishment Clause [of the First
Amendment] is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.
. . . The First Amendment mandates governm.ental neutrality between religion and religion . . . . The State may not adopt programs or
practices ... which 'aid or oppose' any religion.... This prohibition is
absolute .... In short, when we are presented with a state law granting
a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat
the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
constitutionality.56

The above passage emphasizes the importance of the First Amendment's guarantee of religious neutrality and the role that the strict
scrutiny standard plays in protecting that right. Further, Larson,
Smith, and Lukumi are all clear on the proposition that under
either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause, government acts which intentionally discriminate among religions are
strictly scrutinized.s7
B. Strict Scrutiny and the Assessment of Peremptory Challenges
The conclusfon that governmental religious discrimination must
be strictly scrutinized is especially warranted for the peremptory
challenge because the Court has repeatedly stressed the need for
governmental religious neutrality in the selection 'of public officials.ss Th.is command of government neutrality is directly applicable to the selection of jury members. The Court has characterized
55. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47 & n.23. The Cotirt explicitly rejected the argument that
the statute was "a facially neutral statute, the provisions of which happen to have a disparate
impact upon different religious organizations. On the contrary [the statute] makes explicit
and deliberate distinctions between different religious orgahlzations." Larson, 456 U.S. at
247 n.23.
·
56, Larson, 456 U.S. at 244, 246 (citations omitted). _
57. Larson recognized that governmental religious discrimination violated either clause
of the First Amendment and that under both clauses strict scrutiny was necessary. "This
constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the
continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause." Larson, 456 U.S. at 245.
58. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246; McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 {1961). Both Torcaso and McDaniel state the proposition that
the government must be neutral among religions in the selection of public officials. In Torcaso, the Court struck down Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution which required an oath of belief in God to serve in public office. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at
489. The Court stated that the Government may not "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another." Torcaso, 367 U.S. at _493. Nor can the Government "pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,
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jury service as a public office.59 In exercising a peremptory challenge, a litigant is a state actor choosing state officials. Thus, the
First Amendment guarantees religious neutrality in this selection
procedure, and any facial violation of that neutrality must be
strictly scrutinized.60

m.

STrucr ScRUTINY UNDER THE EouAL PRoTEcnoN CLAusE

Government acts which distinguish among persons on the basis
of religion also trigger strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause. There are no equal protection cases which have directly applied strict scrutiny to government classifications among
religions. This omission is traceable to the fact that religious discrimination cases have traditionally been decided under the First
Amendment.61
Historically there have been two types of government classifications reviewed under strict scrutiny: those that classify persons on
the basis of their exercise of a "fundamental right" and those that
affect a suspect class.62 Section III.A argues that religious groups
are a suspect class, and section ID.B argues that the practice of religion is a fundamental right.
and neither can [it] aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs." Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495.
A similar statute was struck down in McDaniel. A plurality of the Court applied strict
scrutiny and invalidated the statute. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (" '(T]o condition the
availability of benefits, [including access to the ballot] upon this appellant's ••• religious faith
•.. effectively penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional liberties.'" (quoting Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963))). In his concurrence, Justice Brennan stated: "[The
Tennessee provision] establishes a religious classification - involvement in protected religious activity - governing the eligibility for office, which I believe is absolutely prohibited."
McDanie~ 435 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. "The peremptory challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quintessential governmental body . . . . The jury exercises the power of the court and of the government that
confers the court's jurisdiction." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624
(1991); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51-54 (1992).
60. Torcaso and McDaniel also discuss the benefits associated with serving in a public
office. The Court's recent peremptory challenge cases have all emphasized the significant
benefits to a potential juror of jury service. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court
spoke at length about these benefits:
Jury service . . . "affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a
process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for law." Indeed,
with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is
their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
Powers, 499 U.S. at 407. (citation omitted). The right to serve on a jury is a "duty, honor, and
privilege," Powers, 499 U.S. at 415, and as such, discrimination among religions in the granting of this benefit is a violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of religious neutrality.
61. Such classifications receive strict scrutiny when reviewed under the First Amendment.
See supra section II.A.
62. "[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny .•• when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976) (footnotes omitted); see also TRIBE, supra note 17, §§ 16-7, 16-13.
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A. Religious Affiliation Is a Suspect Classification

The Court has defined suspect classes as those groups "saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." 63 Certain religious groups fit this definition
because of America's unfortunate history of religious
discrimination.64
Furthermore, since the Court first considered heightened scrutiny for suspect classifications in footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co., the Court has listed religion along with race
as a suspect category.65 More recently, the Court has recognized
that strict scrutiny is applied when "inherently suspect distinctions
such as race, religion, or alienage" are involved.66 Therefore, religious affiliation is a suspect classification, and government acts that
distinguish among persons on the basis of religion must be strictly
scrutinized.67
In applying this analysis to peremptory challenges, however,
there is a question whether a specific history of discrimination in
jury selection must be proven. Language in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B. suggests that a history of discrimination against a particular
group in jury selection may be necessary to extend Batson beyond
63. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
64. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.1, 8-14 (1947) (detailing the history of religious
discrimination in America); MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS (1984); JOEL
FETZER, SELECI1VE PROSECUTION OF RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED OFFENDERS IN AMERICA
(1989); GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES (1943); HAROLD E.
QUINLEY & CHARLEs Y. GLOCK, ANTI·SEMIDSM IN AMERICA (1979}; ANTI·SEMITISM IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (David A. Gerber ed., 1986). Of course, religious discrimination continues today. For example, five state constitutions still require a belief in God as a prerequisite to serving in public office thirty-five years after such provisions were ruled
unconstitutional in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). See Mo. CONST. art. XXXVI;
PA. CONST. art I, § 4; S.C. CoNST. art. VI, § 2; TENN. CoNST. art IX, § 2; TEX. CoNST. art. I,
§ 4. See generally EDD DoERR & ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND STATE
CoNSTITUTIONS 15-16 (1993).
65. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (holding that heightened scrutiny is appropriate for
"statutes directed at particular religious, or national or racial minorities" (citations omitted}).
66. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 885 (1985) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
67. This statement directly contradicts a recent Ohio state court decision concerning
religion·based peremptory challenges, State v. Lundgren, Nos. 90·L-15-140; 91-L-036, 1993
WL 346444 (Ohio Ct App. Sept 14, 1993), affd., 653 N.E2d 304 {1995). Lundgren stated
that Batson should not be extended to religion because there is no analogy between religion
and race. Lundgren, 1993 WL 346444, at *39. The Ohio court based this holding upon the
statement that religion is not a suspect class for equal protection purposes. See Lundgren,
1993 WL 346444, at *39.
The basis for Lundgren has been undermined by the preceding discussion. First, section
III.A shows that religion is a suspect class under equal protection. Second, the court ignores
the fundamental right to governmental religious neutrality under the Equal Protection
Clause and the First Amendment
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race.68 Both J.E.B. and Batson cite to a specific history of discrimination in jury selection - against women and minorities respectively - that cannot be similarly documented in the area of
religion.69 The Minnesota Supreme Court cited this lack of a history of religious discrimination in jury selection in refusing to expand Batson to religion.10
There are several reasons why this lack of history is not fatal to
a claim that religion-based peremptory challenges should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. First, unlike gender or race, religion
has always had the First Amendment to ensure government religious neutrality. Consequently, there could be no religious discrimination mandated by statutes similar to those denying jury
participation to blacks71 and women.12
Second, J.E.B. states as bases for its decision both a specific history of discrimination against women in jury selection and a general
" 'long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,' a history
which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender based
classifications today." 73 Although religion lacks a specific history of
jury discrimination, a similar unfortunate general history of reli68. J.E.B. states:
While the prejudicial attitudes toward women in this country have not been identical
to those held toward racial minorities, the similarities between the experiences of racial
minorities and women, in some contexts, "overpower those differences." ..• Certainly,
with respect to jury service, African-Americans and women share a history of total exclusion, a history which came to an end for women many years after the embarrassing
chapter in our history came to an end for African-Americans.
We need not determine, however, whether women or racial minorities have suffered
more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of our Nation's history. It is necessary only to acknowledge that "our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination," a history which warrants the heightened scrutiny we
afford all gender-based classifications today.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994) (citations omitted) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973)).
69. J.E.B. cites a history of gender discrimination in jury service. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at
1424 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (holding that women could not be
excluded from the venire in federal trials in states where women were eligible for jury service), and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 {1975) (striking down a statute which exempted
women from jury service under the Sixth Amendment)). Batson cites a similar history of
race discrimination in jury service. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-87 (1986) (citing
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding the exclusion of black citizens as
jurors unconstitutional); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906) (holding that criminal defendants have a right to be tried by a jury selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria); and
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (holding unconstitutional the assumption that members of the black race are not qualified to serve as jurors)); see also Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991) ("Powers relied upon over a century of jurisprudence
dedicated to the elimination of race prejudice within the jury selection process.").
70. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994)
(reading the Supreme Court peremptory challenge jurisprudence to require religion-based
discrimination to be a historical and systematic illness in the jury selection process).
71. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
72. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
73. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (citation omitted).
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gious discrimination exists in the United States, a history which justifi.es treating religion as a suspect classifi.cation.74
Finally, given the Court's focus upon the potential juror's constitutional right to nondiscrimination in jury selection, the question of
a history of discrimination in jury selection seems misguided. The
fundamental question is whether the equal protection rights of the
juror at issue have been violated, and a history of discrimination is
simply irrelevant to this question. As J.E.B. stated: "the exclusion
of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and
undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system."75 Any
requirement of systematic violations was overruled when Batson replaced the strictures of Swain v. Alabama. 16
B. Free Exercise of Religion Is a Fundamental Right
The Equal Protection Clause also demands strict scrutiny when
state action impinges upon a fundamental right. Fundamental
rights are those which are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution." 77 The Court has stated that "[u]nquestionably, the
free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right." 78
Government classifi.cations which burden the practice of a fundamental right are to be strictly scrutinized.79 A government religious
classifi.cation which results in members of a religion being denied
the opportunity to serve on a jury clearly constitutes a "burden" on
the free exercise of that religion.
74. See supra note 64.
75. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.14; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 {1986) ("'[A]
consistent pattern of official racial discrimination' is not 'a necessary predicate to a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not
'immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.'" (citations omitted)).
76. See supra notes 18-19. Swain required a pattern of discriminatory peremptory challenges before any peremptories could be found unconstitutional. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 223-25 (1965). Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), overruled this requirement
and held that any single peremptory challenge could be found improper.
77. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Examples of
implied fundamental rights are the right to interstate travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757-59 {1966), the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 {1973), and the
right to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
78. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974).
79. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2813-33 {1992) (applying strict
scrutiny to possible violations of a woman's fundamental liberty interest in terminating pregnancy); Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1990) (holding strict scrutiny review necessary to analyze an abridgement of the First Amendment right
to political expression); Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 366 (1988); Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (strict scrutiny review applies to violations of a fundamental right); see also TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-7 ("Legislative and administrative classifications are to be strictly scrutinized and thus held unconstitutional absent a
compelling governmental interest if they distribute benefits or burdens in a manner inconsistent with fundamental rights.").
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STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS

Parts II and III argued separately that under either the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny should
be applied to religion-based peremptory challenges. As stated in
Part II, the analysis of facial religious discrimination under the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause is now essentially the
same. As Justice O'Connor stated:
[An] emphasis on equal treatment is, I think, an eminently sound approach. In my view, the Religion Clauses - the Free Exercise
Clause, the Religious Test Clause,B0 and the Equal Protection Clause
... all speak with one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual
circumstances, one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits.Bl
This Part applies strict scrutiny review to religion-based per-

emptory challenges and concludes that they are unconstitutional.
Under either First Amendment or Equal Protection analysis, the
strict scrutiny standard is the same: the law or practice at issue
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.82 Religion-based peremptory challenges are a form of religious
discrimination and are subject to strict scrutiny.
Religion-based peremptory challenges pass the first prong of
strict scrutiny; they are "justified by a compelling government interest. "B3 As J.E.B. recognized, the government's "legitimate interest"
in providing a fair and impartial trial is sufficiently compelling to
pass the first requirement of strict scrutiny.84 The necessary question, therefore, is how effective religion-based peremptory challenges are in guaranteeing a fair trial.BS Section IV.A argues that
religion-based peremptory challenges are not sufficiently narrowly
80. Article VI of the Constitution states: "[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
81. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2497 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
82. Compare Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982) (holding under the First Amendment that "rule must be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling government interest,
and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest" (citations omitted)) with Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986) (holding under the Equal Protection
Clause that "[t]o pass constitutional muster racial classifications must be necessary to the
accomplishment of their legitimate purpose ••• [and] narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that goal" (citations omitted)).
83. Larson, 456 U.S. at 247; see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
113 S. Ct 2217, 2233 (1993) ("[A] law restrictive of religious practice must advance 'interests
of the highest order.'" (citation omitted)).
84. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994).
85. The J.E.B. Court recognized the centrality of this question:
In making this assessment, we do not weigh the value of peremptory challenges as an
institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate invidious discrimination from
the courtroom. Instead we consider whether peremptory challenges based on gender
stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.
114 S. Ct. at 1425-26.
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tailored to survive strict scrutiny because they are based on stereotypical assumptions about religious views. Section IV.B argues
that religion-based peremptory challenges are not narrowly tailored
because there is a less restrictive alternative: litigants could focus
on actually ascertained beliefs of potential jurors instead of mere
religious affiliation.

A. Narrow Tailoring
The constitutionality of religion-based peremptory challenges
depends on whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate goal of supplying a fair trial. In assessing the effectiveness of
gender-based peremptory challenges, J.E.B. cited juror studies on
the connection between gender and jury behavior. The Court concluded that there was "virtually no support for the conclusion that
gender alone is an accurate predictor of juror's attitudes."86 The
data concerning religious affiliation and jury behavior is even less
well-developed than that concerning gender, and the available studies provide no support for the claim that religious affiliation alone is
an accurate predictor of juror attitudes.87
Religion-based peremptory challenges violate strict scrutiny because they depend on stereotypical assumptions. Stereotypes without any statistical evidence cannot withstand strict scrutiny.ss The
religious stereotypes which have been used as proxies for juror behavior are similar to the gender stereotypes described in J.E.B. 89
86. 114 s. a. at 1426-27.
87. See REID HAsnE ET AL., INSIDE THE JUROR 124 {1983) (stating that while some social
scientists have concluded that religion, among several other factors, may have an effect in
certain cases, there is little scientific evidence that religion makes any difference in trial
outcomes).
According to Professor Abbott, the "basic" factors in anticipating juror behavior are age,
sex, race, occupation, marital status, and spouse's occupation. WALTER F. ABBOT!', ANALYTIC JUROR RATER § 4.02 (1987). The supplementary predictors are residential location,
socio-economic status, presidential and party choices, religious identity and attendance practices, and attitudinal and lifestyle factors. Id. § 4.03. These factors can be used to find out
whether the juror is an authoritarian personality or not, which can be a predicting factor.
"Extreme Authoritarianism as a personality type has been variously linked with ••• orthodox
religious beliefs..•." Id. § 6.05(c). Religion was listed along with nine other indicia of extreme authoritarianism. Abbott asserts that "authoritarians are typically more inclined to
convict" but also cites a study stating the exact opposite conclusion. Id. § 6.05(c).
The evidence regarding religion as a factor in jury behavior is meager and inconclusive at
best, and religion has never been shown to be an accurate predictor.
88. See J.E.B., 114 S. a. at 1426-27.
89. See J.E.B., 114 S. a. at 1427 n.10. Professor Abramson provides an example of religious stereotyping in jury selection:
In a 1936 article for Esquire magazine, Clarence Darrow divided religions and ethnic
groups into the prodefense and proprosecution camps. Favorable to defendants were
Irish, Jews, Unitarians, Universalists, Congregationalists, and agnostics. The ideal prosecution juror had high regard for the law and a religious attitude toward sin and punishment, qualities found among Scandinavians in particular but also among Lutherans,
Baptists, and Presbyterians.
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The government has an interest in guaranteeing a fair trial, but the
lack of evidence supporting religion-based peremptory challenges'
role in supplying an impartial jury leads to the conclusion that such
peremptories are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to fit the governmental interest.
B. A Less Restrictive Alternative

This section argues that courts can better serve the government
interest of supplying a fair trial and better protect the rights of potential jurors by requiring a showing of the potential juror's actual
beliefs, rather than mere religious affiliation, before removing any
juror for potential bias.
An analysis of whether a government policy is "narrowly tailored" requires consideration of whether lawful and less-restrictive
means are available.9o Peremptory challenges based solely on religious affiliation are not narrowly tailored because they are both underinclusive and overinclusive. They are underinclusive insofar as
challenges on the basis of religious affiliation overlook nonreligious
potential jurors who may hold beliefs similar to those of a religious
potential juror. They are overinclusive because not every member
of a religious sect believes every tenet of that faith, so challenges on
the basis of religious affiliation remove jurors who may not actually
hold the potential bias.
A focus on actually ascertained beliefs is a lawful and less restrictive means for ascertaining juror bias. This can be stated as a
constitutional command to "ask the second question." Litigants
should inquire as to what the actual beliefs of the juror are before
Similarly, a 1935 trial manual provided lawyers with a scale for rating fiurors] ••.. In
medical malpractice cases ... the plaintiff was warned away from Jewish jurors because
"most Jews want their sons to become doctors ••. and they want their daughters to
marry doctors."
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, TIIE JURY 147 (1994) {footnotes omitted). For a particularly bizarre example of religious stereotyping in the use of the peremptory challenge, consider the
Marcos-Khashoggi trial. Imelda Marcos, wife of the ex-President of the Philippines, and
Adnan Khashoggi, an Arab businessman and arms-dealer, were on the same side at trial, yet
Khashoggi's lawyers wanted to eliminate Jewish potential jurors because of supposed antiArab bias, while Marcos's lawyers thought Jewish jurors would be ideal because Jews are
"sensitive to persecution and suspicious of government power." See STEVEN J. ADLER, THE
JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN TIIE AMERICAN COURTROOM 57-58 (1994).
90. The Court explained:
The term "narrowly tailored" ••. may be used to require consideration of whether
lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as Professor Ely
has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater precision than any alternative means. "Courts should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a nonracial
approach or a more narrowly-tailored racial cla~sification could promote the substantial
interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense."
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 {1986) (citations omitted} (quoting
Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578-579 {1975)).
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any challenge would be constitutionally permissible.91 There is a
fundamental distinction between religious affiliation and actually
ascertained religious beliefs. Even if the peremptory challenge is
based upon the presumed religious views of the juror and not upon
any prejudice, not every member of a religion will agree with all of
the tenets of that religion. Consider the division among Catholics
on the issue of abortion. Assuming that any and all Catholics are
pro-life would not be a fair treatment of Catholic potential jurors in
a case where abortion was at issue.
If the voir dire establishes that a juror's religious beliefs will bias
her significantly in a particular case, then a removal for cause is
proper.92 Even if the religious belief at issue cannot satisfy the
higher standard of a challenge for cause, however, the potential juror still may be subject to a peremptory challenge on the basis of an
actually held belief rather than solely on the basis of a religious
affiliation. If a litigant can establish that a potential juror's religious
views may bias the juror, then the litigant has provided a neutral
explanation, and the peremptory challenge should be upheld.
The distinction between group affiliation and actual bias is
found in both Batson and J.E.B. These cases held that biased notions of either race or sex cannot act as a neutral explanation but
91. The importance of this differential between mere knowledge of religious affiliation
and actual knowledge of religious beliefs is underscored by the First Amendment analysis in
Part II. If the Government must remain absolutely religiously neutral in the selection of
public officials, then not only are peremptory challenges on the basis of religious affiliation
unconstitutional, but so are peremptories on the basis of actual religious beliefs, and arguably
even removals for cause that impact a religious belief.
The argument should not be stretched to this extent. First, challenges - whether peremptory or for cause - based on actual beliefs are neutral as to religion and therefore disparately impact religious belief. For example, if a lawyer removes all potential jurors who are
pro-life from the trial of an abortion clinic bombing, this action may disparately impact certain religious affiliations. The act is neutral, however, because the lawyer is removing potential jurors on the basis of a nonreligious belief that any member of the venire may share.
Assuming that the litigant does remove all pro-life jurors regardless of religious affiliation,
such a peremptory challenge is based on actual beliefs of the jurors, and the government act
is religion-neutral. A neutral government act would fall under Employment Division v. Smith
and would not be strictly scrutinized. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
Second, even if a challenge {whether peremptory or for cause) based on actually held
beliefs were strictly scrutinized, the challenge would pass. The government's interest in a fair
and impartial trial would necessarily be hampered by a rule that forced the litigants to accept
a juror, no matter how biased his or her beliefs were, simply because the juror's beliefs were
religious beliefs.
Furthermore, this "second question" approach also answers the claims of religion-based
peremptory challenge proponents that such challenges differ from peremptories based on
race or gender because there is a significantly greater correspondence between religious affiliation and beliefs than between race or gender and beliefs. See Casarez v. Texas, No. 111493, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140 at *73-79 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (Meyers, J.,
dissenting); J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 10 IND. L.J. 569, 595-97 (1995). Even if there is an incrementally better correspondence, there is no argument that it would work better than actually ascertaining the
potential juror's beliefs through substantive questioning.
92. For a discussion of challenges for cause, see supra note 2.
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emphasized that a peremptory challenge is proper if a juror actually
holds prejudicial beliefs.93 The same distinction should be made between religious beliefs which are actually held and beliefs which are
presumed on the basis of religious affiliation. Therefore, absent a
showing of pretext, a juror may be removed on the basis of personal
religious beliefs when voir dire has established that the juror actually holds those beliefs.
This Note's approach also comports with the Court's treatment
of the strict scrutiny requirement that the government classification
be narrowly tailored. A peremptory challenge based upon a potential juror's identified beliefs rather than religious affiliation would
constitute a significantly better constitutional fit. An approach that
established the necessity of asking the second question would better
promote the government's interest in a fair trial and avoid violation
of the constitutional rights of the excluded juror.94
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF ELIMINATING RELIGION-BASED
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

This Part discusses the practical implications of eliminating
religion-based peremptories and argues that these implications do
not present a significant obstacle to an extension of Batson to
religion.
Section V.A rebuts the objection that extending Batson to religion will result in the eventual demise of the peremptory challenge.
Section V.B discusses and rejects the objection that the Batson test
has been relatively unsuccessful in stemming race discrimination in
jury selection, and therefore extending Batson to religion offers no
help to religion or race.
93. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986). The distinction between a belief presumed on the basis of race and
a belief actually held was also emphasized by the Court in Georgia v. McCollum:
We have, accordingly, held that there should be a mechanism for removing those on the
venire whom the defendant has specified reason to believe would be incapable of confronting and suppressing their racism.
But there is a distinction between exercising a peremptory challenge to discriminate
invidiously against jurors on account of race and exercising a peremptory challenge to
remove an individual juror who harbors racial prejudice.
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58-59 (1992) (citations omitted).
94. Such an inquiry would only be proper if the religious views of the juror might constitute a bias. In the majority of cases, religious affiliation is simply irrelevant. The irrelevance
of religion to jury service has been recognized at common law:
Ordinarily at common law, inquiry on voir dire into a juror's religious affiliation and
beliefs is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such questions is improper. Questions
about religious beliefs are relevant only if pertinent to religious issues involved in the
case, or if a religious organization is a party, or if the information is a necessary predicate for a voir dire challenge.
State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1993) (citing Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d
951, 954 (D.C. 1977), and United States v. Schullo, 390 F. Supp. 1067 (D. Minn. 1975)).
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A. Preservation of Peremptory Challenges

Eliminating religion-based peremptory challenges will have a
narrow effect and will not result in the elimination of peremptory
challenges altogether. Ever since the Court began requiring
nondiscriminatory explanations for certain peremptory challenges,
judges and commentators alike have argued that Batson has resulted in the de facto end of the peremptory challenge, because the
peremptory has traditionally been wholly unexplained.95 These arguments apply equally to any extension of Batson: the more circumstances that are included, the less unexplained the peremptory
becomes.96
First, the argument against expanding Batson has already been
lost by its extension to gender in J.E.B. Further, the concern that
this expansion would engulf any and all group affiliations was specifically denied by J.E.B., which stated that "[p]arties may also exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any
group or class of individuals normally subject to 'rational basis' review."97 Therefore, the debate is limited only to those groups that
95. This argument began in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Batson, 416 U.S. at 124 (arguing that the majority decision signaled the eventual end of the peremptory challenge).
Note that Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson argued explicitly for eradicating the
peremptory challenge altogether, 476 U.S. at 102-8 (arguing that under equal protection
analysis, the proper remedy is the elimination the peremptory challenge altogether).
Commentators have argued for abolishing the peremptory challenge as well. See
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L.
REv. 369 {1992); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Role of
the Jury, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 1041 {1995); Jeffrey Toobin, Juries on Trial, THE NEw YORKER,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 42 (arguing for the elimination of the peremptory challenge); cf. Robert M.
O'Connell, Note, The Elimination of Racism from Jury Selection, Challenging the Peremptory
Challenge, 32 B.C. L. REv. 433 {1991) (arguing that any peremptory challenges that conflict
with principles of equal protection must be eliminated).
Others have advocated peremptories because of their efficacy. See Barbara Allen
Babcock, Jury Service and Community Representation, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM 460, 479 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); John C. Blattner, Book Notice, Courts
and Constitutions, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1363, 1369-71 (1995) (reviewing STEVEN J. ADLER, THE
JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN CoURTROOM (1994)); J. Suzanne Bell
Chambers, Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 10 IND. L.J.
569, 573-76 (1995).
96. One commentator stated:
The claim that the [Batson] rule is in hopeless conflict with the [peremptory] challenge is
frequently linked to the suggestion that the ban on jury discrimination must inevitably
expand to prohibit not only jury selection based on race, but also jury selection based on
religion, national origin, gender, language, disability, age, occupation, political party, and
a host of other categories. The relationship between the two points is clear: the longer
the list of prohibited categories, the less room there is for a lawful challenge other than a
challenge for cause.
Underwood, supra note 28, at 761 (footnote omitted).
97. J.E.B., 114 S. a. at 1429. Examples of group affiliations subject to rational basis
review are: mental retardation, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 446 (1985); wealth, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977); age, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976); and occupation, see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
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receive some level of heightened scrutiny under equal protection.
Among the recognized groups that receive heightened scrutiny,
only religion has yet to be invalidated as a basis for peremptory
challenges.
Second, religion is an infrequent basis for peremptory challenges,98 and invalidating such peremptories would have a much
smaller impact than the invalidation of race- or gender-based peremptories. Under the common law, voir-dire questions concerning
a potential juror's religious affiliation are proscribed as prejudicial
and irrelevant.99 Therefore, litigants generally will not even know
the religious affiliation of the potential jurors, and the occurrence
of religion-based peremptories will be infrequent.
B. Batson's Ineffectiveness in Practice

Despite the potential practical difficulties of eliminating discrimination in the use of the peremptory challenge, whether aimed at
race, sex, or religion, the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause
should be applied, and Batson should be extended. State and federal courts have had difficulties applying Batson's three-part test,
and these difficulties must be considered in any discussion of an
expansion of Batson to religion. Some commentators argue that
the neutral explanations that courts have accepted after Batson objections are so numerous that Batson has become a virtual. sieve.100
It is unclear whether the difficulty lies with the Batson test itself or
with hostility by the courts to Batson. Nonetheless, in eliminating
only the most egregious examples of race discrimination, the Batson
test has failed to cure racism in the jury selection process. The
same Batson test is applied to gender-based peremptories under

98. A survey of over 2,000 state and federal Batson cases found that "[i]n only a handful
of the cases we studied did the prosecutor offer a neutral explanation based upon religion."
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 21, at 246.
99. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (1993). For a quotation from Davis concerning
this common law rule, see supra note 94.
100. Consider the following from Raphael and Ungvarsky:
A prosecutor who wishes to rebut the prima facie case does not face a significant
challenge. In our data, only a small percentage of the neutral explanations for peremptory strikes were rejected. Indeed, those explanations that were rejected often involved
the clearest cases of Batson violations, such as prosecutors who explained that they
struck the juror based on race or prosecutors who gave no reason for striking the juror.... These cases intimate that courts are often uncritical in evaluating neutral expla·
nations. In fact, our research demonstrates that in almost any situation a prosecutor can
readily craft an acceptable neutral explanation to justify striking black jurors because of
their race.
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 21, at 235-36 (citations omitted).
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J.E.B. 10 1 and would almost certainly be the test applied for religionbased peremptory challenges.102
It should be noted, however, that extending Batson to religion
may actually help in solving the problems experienced under the
Batson test by eliminating a formerly neutral explanation. In extending Batson to gender in J.E.B., the Court stated:
Failing to provide jurors the same protection against gender discrimination as race discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson
itself. Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender
can be used as a pretext for racial discrimination. Allowing parties to
remove racial minorities from the jury not because of their race, but
because of their gender, contravenes well-established equal protection principles and could insulate effectively racial discrimination
from judicial scrutiny.103

The above rationale applies equally to peremptories on the basis of
religion, which overlaps both race and gender. As long as religionbased peremptories are permitted, they will serve to shield both
race and gender discrimination. Furthermore, as with gender discrimination in J.E.B., the majority of religion-based peremptory
challenge cases arose as race-neutral explanations for "the use of
the peremptory challenge to remove minorit[ies]."104 As courts be101. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-30. The Batson test is also applied under Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631
(1991); and Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991).
102. It is not within the scope of this Note to argue a new standard for the Batson test,
although several commentators have made sensible suggestions. Raphael & Ungvarsky advocate a four-part test of neutrality:
The trial court must (A) independently confirm the basis of the explanation; (B) affirmatively find that any_ other jurors with similar characteristics to the challenged juror·were
struck; (C) determine that an explanation based on characterizations of a group which
includes a juror be shown specifically true of the challenged juror; and (D) find that an
explanation is rational, meaningful, and related to the particular case.
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 21, at 268; see also Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal
Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina,
69 N.C. L. REv. 1533, 1566 n.304 (1991) (arguing that "vague and highly subjective" explanations be rejected); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror
Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 361-66 (1993)
(arguing for rejection of all explanations that cannot be confirmed by the record).
All of these suggested Batson standards are consistent with this Note's emphasis on the
distinction between mere knowledge of religious affiliation and the actual content of a venire
person's religious beliefs. See supra section IV.B.
103. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (footnotes omitted).
104. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 n.18. The religion-based peremptory challenge cases that
have arisen out of objections on the basis of race discrimination are: United States v. Greer,
939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated in part on rehg. en bane, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993); United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990); Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (III. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Young,
569 So. 2d 570, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Worthy, 532 So. 2d 541, 553 (La. Ct. App.
1988); State v. Brown, 522 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767, 771 n.3 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d
577, 583 (Miss. 1988); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987); State v. Lundgren,
Nos. 90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL 346444 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993), affd., 653
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gin to apply J.E.B., religion can also be expected as a neutral expla-

nation used to justify gender discrimination.
Insofar as extending Batson to religion is not helpful, the failure
is attributable to Batson's three-part test and not the constitutional
underpinnings of an argument for eliminating religion-based peremptory challenges. No one could fairly argue that because Batson's three-part test has not been wholly effective, Batson should be
overturned. Likewise, the difficulties associated with the test
should not bar Batson's expansion to religion.
·
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that religion-based peremptory challenges
are unconstitutional. This issue is important on more than an intellectual level because Batson and its progeny represent an effort by
the Court to end discrimination in jury selection: if courts refuse to
extend the Batson doctrine to suspect classes besides race and gender, this goal will not be reached. In the peremptory challenge
cases, the Court was keenly sensitive to the fact that the discrimination occurred in the courthouse itself. The Court was particularly
disturbed that the justice system required citizens to appear for jury
service, only to subject them to discrimination at the hands of lawyers acting as agents of the court.
Furthermore, in J.E.B., the Court recognized that this harm was
not limited to race; jurors removed on the basis of gender were no
better off than those removed because of race. This reasoning must
be extended to religion. Citizens summarily dismissed on the basis
of their religion have suffered the same harm: they have been
called to serve and then removed on unconstitutional grounds. As
long as religion-based peremptory challenges remain, they, like
race- and gender-based peremptory challenges before them, act as
an unmistakable reminder that discrimination remains a fixture in
our society, even within the walls of the courthouse.

N.E.2d 304 {Ohio 1995); Casarez v. Texas, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868 {Tex. Crim. App.
Dec. 14, 1994); Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Chambers v. State,
724 S.W.2d 440, 442 {Tex. Ct. App. 1987).

